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Such joint measures as Fateh and Hamas are agreed upon fall very far short of challenging the
occupying powers.
 
In the life of the Palestinians and over their history, many settlements meant to be temporary in
nature, nevertheless became permanent and long term. In the 1948 Nakba and ethnic cleansing
[13], my grandparents and other Palestinians uprooted from the historical Palestine expected that
they would be able to return to their lands, houses, farms and hometowns in a week’s time. They
believed it was just temporary; however, sixty four years later, they remain stuck with the status of
permanent refugees. In 1993 when the Palestinian Authority was established, proponents of the
mainstream Palestinian polity and the Oslo Accords believed that the Palestinian Authority as a
quasi-state body was temporary in nature and that by the year 1999, that body would be
transformed into an independent Palestinian state. However, after nineteen years the state seems
much further off than in the nineties, and if it has any reality, it is becoming ever more evident that it
will be a papier-mâché state that lacks both de jure and de facto sovereignty. This unpleasant
transformation of the temporary into permanence has a huge impact on the every day lives of the
Palestinians. The very fact that the Israeli military settler-colonial occupation still persists is  further
proof of this temporary-permanent paradox. My fear and concern is that the West Bank-Gaza Strip
divide, or more precisely, the Fatah-Hamas divide will join the above list and transform itself, from
being short-term in nature, into a lasting and fatal permanence.
For five years now, we have puzzled over the reasons why these two factions (Fatah and Hamas),
both hanging on under conditions of occupation and siege, fail to unite, reconcile and mount a joint
struggle against Israeli occupation? Is it really so difficult and complex a division to overcome? In
failing to understand why this is the case, do the Palestinian people dramatically fail to grasp the
prophetic vision that their ‘leadership’ claim to have? Is this divide really about having an agenda,
strategies, goals and programmes, or it is really about other things that are out of the reach of
ordinary citizens with their limited abilities? Unfortunately, with every new day that passes without
achieving unity, it becomes more evident that there is a ‘divide industry’ or ‘divide business’ that
both factions/authorities benefit from on various levels, in different ways, and using diverse tools and
means. And it seems, from their perspectives, that there is no rush at all to genuinely end this
business of division. Rationally speaking, would anyone liquidate his/her own business while it was
bringing in enough profits and he/she is the exclusive owner of that business? Most likely no, unless
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the stakeholders revolt. This Fatah-Hamas mutual enterprise will carry on through its various stages
and rounds of excuses, obstacles created and more circumstances to be unforeseen, until the
moment that the stakeholders (the Palestinian people in this case) speak out and act to change and
challenge the existing status quo with its multiple layers of oppression and repression.
Over the last five years, authorities in both the West Bank and Gaza deployed various measures to
sustain and subsidise this divide. Getting rid of these measures and this divide is not a
straightforward task, however urgent and popular it may be. The West Bank’s authority has assumed
a West Bank First strategy; creating behavioural and life-style changes among the West Bankers
[14], who now enjoy the diplomatic and financial support of the international community with all its
inducements to implementing a neo-liberal [15] and Weberian governance reform agenda [16]. It is
hoped that this will finally suppress all the youth movement’s efforts and initiatives calling, among
other things, for an immediate reconciliation [17]. The Gaza Strip’s authority has meanwhile
managed the Gaza Strip as if, despite the occupation and the siege, it were a third entity or state.
This has delayed any genuine efforts to induce reconciliation, instead waiting upon the wave of
political Islam in neighbouring countries to bring its positive goods to Gaza. Its leaders have  enjoyed
the official trips and stronger state-like relations with countries such as Iran and Qatar [18]; despite
the fact that this has led to another internal divide between the Inside-Outside leadership of the
Palestinians, identical to the one they suffered under in 1993/4 when Fatah was in charge. The
danger of creating additional facts on the ground makes reaching a reconciliation harder and more
all-consuming and indeed deviates attention away from the core problem in the Palestinian occupied
territory, which is the Israeli military occupation.
As a result, the two authorities/factions, each armed with its authoritarian regimes and securitization
transformations [19], have assumed parallel programmes and goals. The bottom line for both,
therefore, is how to make sure that they will not intersect, rather than reaching any kind of
compromise solution. Over the last five years both parties have been forced by various actors and on
different occasions to meet, talk and sign, but never firmly agree. Or more precisely maybe (since
there is no transparency in these talks), never implement or carry out whatever agreements they
claim to have made to their respective constituencies. How long can this go on?
It is clear that failure after failure to implement must fuel popular anger [20] and indeed render both
authorities much less legitimate in the eyes of ordinary citizens. Indeed, these Palestinian leaders
are anything but representative: no-one really knows who their leaders are. [21] This introduces
another element of mistrust between the people and the authorities - a gap which can only continue
to widen and require more and more time to be bridged.
However, on top of all of that, Israel and the United States, the two additional beneficiaries from this
mutually reinforced division, are also complicit in creating and sustaining it. The United States,
through its politicized humanitarian and development aid leverage [22] and its brokering role, is
directly responsible for the trapped peace process [23]; and together with Israel’s form of colonial
control, these two powers are able to set the rules of the game. So it seems, neither Fatah nor
Hamas are interested in any genuine challenge to the occupying and imperial powers.
The conclusion is inescapable if you take into account the following recent examples of both
leaderships’ visible keenness on sustaining the status quo. The Palestinian Authority in the West
Bank has reacted to hunger strikes by Khader Adnan [24], Hana Shalabi a [25]nd other freedom
fighters imprisoned in Israeli jails, by doing everything in their power to avoid any spread of this form
of resistance. The suppression of the youth movement and their closely-monitored activities in both
Gaza and the West Bank is another example. The suppression of the Land Day [26] activities and
events and the marches to Al-Quds (Jerusalem) especially in Gaza [27] but also in the West Bank; t
[28]he arrest of journalists [29] and activists on the grounds of their Facebook messages, and the
creation of a Palestinian FBI (for Facebook Investigation [30]) are all proof of this authoritarian
tendency. The electricity and fuel crisis in Gaza represents another surly illustration of this. The two
prime ministers Fayyad and Haniyeh have finally agreed [31] how to solve the problem of supplying
Gaza with electricity and fuel. Basically, Haniyeh will pay Fayyad, so that Gaza will have fuel and
electricity while Fayyad narrows the financial deficit in his government budget and finally succeeds
in forcing the Hamas government to pay up from what West Bank officials describe as their ‘savings’.
This long-delayed win-win situation for the prime ministers and their political constituencies hardly
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indicates an urgent commitment to the Palestinian cause and struggle. Their surreal brinkmanship
masks the root cause for the electricity and fuel crisis in Gaza alongside the many other injustices
and forms of oppression, which are the Israeli siege and occupation and the absence of Palestinian
unity. This is a dangerous obfuscation.
At the end of the day the message is short and clear: until the Palestinians themselves, and only
themselves, revolt against the Fatah-Hamas enterprise, the status quo will remain dominant and
hence the colonial occupation will continue with its ground-plan to steal more lands, build new
settlements and make the establishment of a Palestinian future state an unattainable dream.
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